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The Directionality of Distinctively Mathematical Explanations1
Carl F. Craver and Mark Povich
Abstract: In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), 
Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural 
phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations,
the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and 
other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical 
explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his 
examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each case by appeal to ontic facts that account 
for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction.
The mathematics involved in these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While 
Lange's examples fail to demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical 
explanations, they help to emphasize that many superficially natural scientific explanations 
rely for their explanatory force on relations of stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not 
opposing kinds of scientific explanations; they are different aspects of scientific explanation. 
Keywords: distinctively mathematical explanation, modal conception, ontic conception 
1. Introduction.
In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), 
Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain natural phenomena are best 
explained by appeal to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In distinctively mathematical 
explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about, e.g., statistical 
1 Thank you to Andre Ariew, Philippe Huneman, Danial Kostic, Anya Plutynski, and Tom 
Wysocki for discussions and comments. 
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relevance, causation, or natural law. A distinctively mathematical explanation might describe 
causes, Lange allows, but its explanatory force derives ultimately from appeal to facts that 
are 'more necessary' than causal laws. Lange advances this thesis to argue for the importance 
of a purely modal view of explanation (a view that emphasizes necessities, possibilities, and 
impossibilities, showing that an event had to or could not have happened) in contrast to the 
widely discussed ontic view (a view that associates explanation with describing the relevant 
natural facts, e.g., about how the event was caused or how its underlying mechanisms work).2
Lange operates with a narrower understanding of the ontic conception. He describes it
as the view that all explanations are causal. He cites Salmon, who claimed that, “To give 
scientific explanations is to show how events and statistical regularities fit into the causal 
structure of the world” (Salmon 1984)3 and “To understand why certain things happen, we 
2 There is a growing body of literature on mathematical explanation (Baker 2005; Baker 
and Colyvan 2011; Huneman 2010; Pincock 2011). We focus on Lange because his 
examples have become canonical and because his commitments are so explicitly 
formulated. We suspect that the directionality problem will arise in these other papers as 
well, but these authors are mostly concerned with indispensability and the ontology of 
mathematics, a topic that we (like Lange) hope to sidestep to focus on explanation alone. 
See Craver (forthcoming) for a discussion of directionality problems in network 
explanation. Andersen's (forthcoming) response to Lange is complementary to ours, 
fleshing out a point about explananda at which we only gesture in the conclusion. Our 
main focus is directionality.
3 See the passages quoted in Povich (forthcoming) for evidence that Salmon did not think 
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need to see how they are produced by these mechanisms [processes, interactions, laws]” 
(Salmon 1984). He also cites Lewis (“Here is my main thesis: to explain an event is to 
provide some information about its causal history”; 1986) and Sober (“The explanation of an 
event describes the 'causal structure' in which it is embedded”; 1984).4 In contrast to Lange, 
we adopt a more inclusive understanding of the ontic that embraces any natural regularity 
(Salmon 1989; Craver 2014; Povich forthcoming), e.g., statistical relevance (Salmon 1977), 
natural laws (Hempel 1965), or contingent compositional relations might also figure 
fundamentally in explanation. This point will become crucial below, given that the ontic 
relations that explain the directionality of some explanations are not specifically causal 
relations; but they are ontic in this wider sense.5 Lange's arguments should, however, work 
the ontic conception was strictly causal. As we note, Lange's conception of the ontic 
conception is narrower than one might allow. The primary aim of the ontic conception is 
to insist that whether X explains Y is an objective matter of (natural) fact. 
4 One can believe that mechanistic explanation is important without believing that all 
explanations are causal or mechanical. We show why C = 2πr without describing 
mechanisms. We explain why Obama can sign treaties without describing causes. 
Explanations in epistemology, logic, and metaphysics often work without describing 
causes. The question here is not whether one should be a pluralist about explanation but 
about whether Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is complete and 
whether his contrast with the ontic conception is substantiated by his examples. 
5 For purposes of focus, we leave aside the question of whether the existence of 
distinctively mathematical explanations in fact commits one to the denial of the ontic 
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equally well against this broader understanding of the ontic conception, given that he uses the
examples to show that some explanations of natural facts depend fundamentally on relations 
of necessity that are stronger than mere natural necessity. 
We argue that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed. 
Specifically, it fails to account for the directionality implicit in his examples of distinctively 
mathematical explanation. This failure threatens Lange's argument because it shows that his 
examples do not, in fact, derive their explanatory force from mathematical relations alone 
(independent of ontic considerations). The inadequacy is in each case easily remediable by 
appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and 
unacceptable in the other. That is, Lange's exemplars of distinctively mathematical 
explanation appear to require for their adequacy appeal to natural, ontic facts about, e.g., 
causation, constitution, and regularity. More positively, we suggest that all mechanistic 
explanations are constrained, and so partly constituted, by both ontic and modal facts. Rather 
than seeing an opposition between distinctively mathematical explanations and causal (or 
more broadly ontic) explanations, Lange's examples, as we reinterpret them, direct us to 
understand how these distinct aspects of explanation, these distinct sources of explanatory 
conception or even to the idea that there is a modal form of explanation independent of 
ontic considerations. The fact that mathematics is important to explanation doesn't 
necessarily commit one to the idea that the modal conception has a role to play 
independently of ontic considerations absent further commitments about the relationship 
between mathematics and ontology. Like Lange, we remain silent on the ontology of 
mathematics (492). 
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power, intermingle and interact with one another in most scientific explanations. 
2. Lange's Account of Distinctively Mathematical Explanation.
Lange's goal is to show “how distinctively mathematical explanations work” by 
revealing the “source of their explanatory power” (486). He accepts as a basic constraint on 
his account that it should “fit scientific practice,” that is, that it should judge as “explanatory 
only hypotheses that would (if true) constitute genuine scientific explanations” (486). In 
short, the account should not contradict too many scientific common-sense judgments about 
whether an explanation is good or bad. Lange's goal and his guiding constraint are 
conceptually related: to identify the source of an explanation's power requires identifying the 
key features that sort acceptable explanations from unacceptable explanations of that type. In 
causal explanations, for example, much of the explanatory power comes from knowledge of 
the causal relations among components in a mechanism. Bad causal explanations of this kind 
fail when they misrepresent the relevant causal structure (in ways that matter). In 
mathematical explanations, on Lange's view, the explanatory force comes from mathematical
relations that are 'more necessary' than mere causal or correlational regularities. 
Given this set-up, Lange's account of the explanatory force of distinctively 
mathematical explanations can be undermined by examples that fit Lange's account but that 
would be rejected as bad explanations as a matter of scientific common-sense. The account 
would fail to identify fully the explanatory force in such explanations and so would fail to 
account for the norms governing such explanations.
Lange does not address the canonical form of mathematical explanations. However, 
his examples are readily reconstructed as arguments in which a description of an 
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explanandum phenomenon follows from an empirical premise (EP) describing the relevant 
natural facts, and a mathematical premise (MP) describing one or more more-than-merely-
naturally-necessary facts. To begin with Lange's simplest example:
Strawberries: Why can't Mary divide her strawberries among her three kids?6 
Because she has 23 strawberries, and 23 is not divisible by three.
This explanation can be reconstructed as an argument:
1. Mary has 23 strawberries (EP)
2. 23 is indivisible by 3 (MP)
C. Mary can't divide the strawberries equally among her three kids.7
We would have to tighten the bolts to make the argument valid (e.g., no cutting of 
strawberries is allowed), but the general idea is clear enough. The empirical premise works 
by describing the natural features of a system. They specify, for example, the relevant 
magnitudes (Mary starts with 23 strawberries), and the causal or otherwise relevant 
dependencies among them. All mathematical explanations of natural phenomena require at 
least some empirical premises to show how the mathematics will be applied and to specify 
6 Or “Why didn't she on some particular occasion?” or “Why didn't or couldn't anyone 
ever?” Lange intends all these explananda to be explained by the same explanans; a 
similar multiplicity of explananda can be generated for the examples below. 
7 This example is reconstructed as a sketch of a deductive argument, but distinctively 
mathematical explanations might be inductive. For example, one might explain why fair 
dice will most likely not roll a string of ten consecutive double-sixes on mathematical 
grounds, using logical probability and some math. 
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the natural (empirically discovered) constraints under which the mathematical premises do 
their work. The question is whether those mathematical premises are supplying the bulk of 
the 'force' of the explanation, as appears to be the case in Strawberries.8
Lange's other examples can similarly be reconstructed as arguments mixing empirical 
and mathematical premises.
Trefoil Knot: Why can't Terry untie his shoes? Because Terry has a trefoil knot in his 
shoelace (EP). The trefoil knot is not isotopic to the unknot in three dimensions (EP), 
and only knots isotopic to the unknot in three dimensions can be untied (MP) (489).
Königsberg: Why did Marta fail to walk a path through Königsberg in 1735, crossing
each of its bridges exactly once (an Eulerian walk)? Because, that year, Königsberg's 
bridges formed a connected network with four nodes (landmasses); three nodes had 
three edges (bridges); one had five (EP). But only networks that contain either zero or
two nodes with an odd number of edges permit an Eulerian walk (MP) (489).
Chopsticks: Why is it likely that more tossed chopsticks will be oriented horizontally
rather than vertically? Because the they were tossed randomly (EP) and there are 
8 Lange might object to the inclusion of the empirical premise in this formulation. Instead, 
he might treat the empirical premise as a presupposition of the why question: “Why can't 
Mary divide her 23 strawberries among her three kids?” Answer: “Because 23 is 
indivisible by 3.” In what follows, all of our examples can be so translated without 
affecting the principled incompleteness in the cases, but this reformulation comes at 
considerable cost to the clarity with which the incompleteness can be displayed (see 
Section 4). 
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more ways for a chopstick to be horizontal than to be vertical (MP). If we focus on 
the sphere produced by rotating the chopstick through three dimensions, a chopstick 
can be horizontal anywhere near the equator; it is vertical only near the poles (490).
Cicadas: Why do cicadas with prime life-cycle periods tend to suffer less from 
predation by predators with periodic life cycles than do cicadas with composite 
periods? Because it minimizes predation to have a life cycle that intersects only 
infrequently with that of your periodic predators (EP) and because prime periods 
minimize the frequency of intersection (MP) (498).
Honeycombs: Why do honeybees use at least the amount of wax they would use to 
divide their combs into hexagons of equal area? Because honeybees divide their 
combs (which are planar regions with dividing walls of negligible thickness) into 
regions of equal area (EP) and a hexagonal grid uses the least total perimeter in 
dividing a planar region into regions of equal area (MP) (499).9
Pendulum: Why does Patty's pendulum have at least four equilibrium 
configurations? Because Patty's pendulum is a double pendulum (EP) and any double 
pendulum's configuration space is a torus with at least four stationary points (MP) 
(501).
Central to Lange's broader purposes is the claim that these distinctively mathematical 
9 Lange 'narrows' the explananda in these last two cases. Note that the explananda are not, 
respectively, that cicadas have prime periods and that honeycombs are hexagonal. Those 
explananda have causal (etiological and constitutive) explanations. The narrower 
explananda, Lange argues, have distinctively mathematical explanations.  
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explanations gain their explanatory force from non-causal, and more broadly, non-ontic 
sources: i.e., stronger-than-naturally-necessary relations. Explanatory priority flows 
downward from the more necessary to the less necessary:
In my view, the order of causal priority is not responsible for the order of explanatory 
priority in distinctively mathematical explanations in science. Rather, the facts doing 
the explaining are eligible to explain by virtue of being modally more necessary even 
than ordinary causal laws (as both mathematical facts and Newton's second law are) 
or being understood in the why question's context as constitutive of the physical task 
or arrangement at issue. (506)
For Lange, distinctively mathematical explanations gain their explanatory force from the fact
that they rely fundamentally on mathematical relations that are more necessary than are 
relations of causation and natural law. The norms by which good mathematical explanations 
are sorted from bad mathematical explanations would, according to this account, turn on the 
relevant mathematics and facts about how that mathematics is being applied. In the following
section we argue that Lange's analysis is inadequate.
3. The Inadequacy of Lange's Model.
Lange's account currently leaves unspecified a crucial feature for sorting the 
mathematical arguments that have explanatory power from those that fail as explanations. 
Our argument for this thesis is inspired by Bromberger's example of the flagpole and the 
shadow (1966). At least according to scientific common-sense, one can explain the shadow's 
length by appealing to the flagpole's height, the sun's angle of elevation, and the natural fact 
that light propagates in straight lines. One cannot, in accord with scientific common-sense, 
Forthcoming https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.04.005                           10
explain the flagpole's height in terms of its shadow's length, the angle of the sun's elevation, 
and the natural fact that light propagates in straight lines (in non-intentional contexts; cf. van 
Fraassen 1980, 132–4). In complete accordance with the norms of the once-received, 
covering-law model of explanation (Hempel 1965), one can write a deductive argument 
relating law statements and true descriptions of 'initial' conditions to either conclusion. For 
Bromberger (and Salmon 1984), the example demonstrates an asymmetry in natural 
explanations that the covering-law model could not accommodate. The covering-law model 
is thereby shown to be an inadequate account of the norms of scientific explanation. 
More generally, the example demonstrates that at least some (and in fact, many) 
explanations have a preferred direction. Salmon, for example, used this example (among 
others) to argue that scientific explanations work by tracing the antecedent causal structure of
an event: Light leaves the sun, passes the flagpole, and lands on the ground. Causation 
enforces this temporal direction. No such causal sequence proceeds from the shadow to the 
height of the flagpole (outside intentional contexts). Considerations of just this sort underlie 
both Lewis' and Sober's emphasis on causation as the fundament of scientific explanation. In 
what follows, we emphasize the directionality of explanations, not their asymmetry. It does 
not matter for our purposes whether all the same statements in one explanation are reordered 
in the other. In some cases this is possible; in others it is not. What matters, instead, is that 
one can generate an explanation that fits the form of a distinctively mathematical explanation
that appears to violate our common-sense norms about the acceptable and unacceptable 
directions of scientific explanation.
If one is committed to the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations of 
Forthcoming https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.04.005                           11
natural phenomena, then one must find a way to reconcile the directionlessness of many 
applications of mathematics with the directionality of natural explanations. The kinds of 
relation described in algebra, geometry, and calculus are directionless; with addition or 
division, a variable on one side of the equation can be moved to the other side. They have no 
intrinsic left-right directions; rather, these must be imposed from the outside. This is why 
Lange's examples of putative distinctively mathematical explanation face a directionality 
challenge. Each of Lange's examples can be 'reversed' to yield an argument that appeals to 
the same mathematical premise and that has the same form as Lange's examples but that 
would not be counted as an acceptable explanation (absent considerable revision in scientific 
common-sense). Consider, for example:
Reversed Strawberries. Why doesn't Mary have 23 strawberries? Because she 
divided her strawberries equally among her three kids (EP) and 23 is indivisible by 3 
(MP).
Like Strawberries, Reversed Strawberries can be represented as a deductive argument with 
both an empirical and a mathematical premise:
1. Mary evenly distributed her strawberries among her three kids (EP).
2. 23 is indivisible by 3 (MP).
C. Mary doesn't have 23 strawberries.
From a common-sense perspective, at least, Mary's even-numbered pile of strawberries 
explains but is not explained by her dividing the pile equally among the children.10 (And 
10 Catherine Stinson (personal communication) emphasizes that this claim must be bracketed
to nonintentional contexts. Mary might decide, for example, to bake a certain number of 
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surely the number of children Mary had is not explained by her distribution of strawberries 
today, though a mathematical argument of that sort could be constructed as well.) Note 
further that the implicit directionality in this explanation is plausibly accounted for by ontic 
assumptions about the kinds of relations that properly carry explanatory force: i.e., that 
Mary's pile is the cause (the source) of the portions each kid gets. In contrast, the portions do 
not cause the number of strawberries or the number of children. The trefoil knot example 
faces a similar reversal:
Reversed Trefoil Knot: Why doesn't Terry have a trefoil knot in his shoelace? 
Because Terry untied the knot (EP) and the trefoil knot is not isotopic to the unknot in
three dimensions, and only knots isotopic to the unknot in three dimensions can be 
untied (MP).
But it would seem more in line with scientific common-sense to explain why Terry has a 
particular kind of knot by describing how he tied it and not by describing his ability or 
inability to untie it. 
Reversed Königsberg: Why did either zero or two of Königsberg's landmasses have 
an odd number of bridges in 1756? Because Marta walked through town, hitting each 
bridge exactly once (EP) and only networks containing zero or two nodes with an odd
degree contain an Eulerian path (MP).
As in the other examples, Königsberg's layout is arguably better explained by the decisions of
cookies knowing they will have to be evenly divided among her kids, or she might decide 
to have three kids because she decides that three is the maximum number of children she 
can support on her income. These are intentional, causal explanations.
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the Burgermeister than by Marta's walk, yet facts about Königsberg's layout follow reliably 
from descriptions of either.
Reversed Chopsticks: Why were the chopsticks tossed non-randomly? Because 
more of the tossed chopsticks were oriented vertically than horizontally (EP) and 
there are more ways for a chopstick to be horizontal than to be vertical (MP).
In this 'reversal,' the unexpected number of vertically oriented chopsticks provides evidence 
that some biasing force must be acting upon them (much as deviations from the Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium detect selective forces). As in Lange's forward-directed version of the 
example, the argument here is inductive. But while we are apt to count Lange's original 
example as explanatory, it seems more fitting with scientific common-sense to describe 
Reversed Chopsticks as describing an evidential, not explanatory, relation. In the case of 
Cicadas, suppose that a field scientist discovers a species of Cicadas that thrives despite the 
fact that its life cycle overlaps considerably with that of its periodic predators: 
Reversed Cicadas: Why doesn't it minimize predation in these Cicadas to have a life 
cycle that intersects only infrequently with that of your periodic predators? Because 
cicadas with prime life-cycle periods don't tend to suffer less from predation by 
predators with periodic life cycles than do cicadas with composite periods (EP) and 
because prime periods minimize the frequency of intersection (MP).
To modify the example and give a more intuitive appeal, suppose that the life-cycles of a 
species of Cicada and its periodic predator overlap only every 21 years. This places 
constraints on the space of possible periods for the life-cycles in these species: 1, 3, 7, and 21
years are the available options. If we know on empirical grounds that 1 and 21 are not live 
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options and that the life-cycle of the cicada is 7 years, and we package that into the request 
for explanation, we can infer with mathematical certainty that the predator cycle is 3 years. 
But it would seem that the frequency of intersection is explained by the life-cycles, not that 
the life-cycles are explained by the frequency of their intersection. 
Reversed Honeycombs: Why does this species of honeybees divide their combs into 
regions of unequal area? Because honeybees use less than the amount of wax they 
would use to divide their combs into hexagons of equal area (EP) and a hexagonal 
grid uses the least total perimeter in dividing a planar region into regions of equal 
area (MP).
But it is a stretch from common-sense to think of the bee's hive-construction as explained by 
the fact that it uses less wax than a hexagonal grid. (If there were such an explanation, it 
would be a selectionist, and so causal, explanation on Lange's view [498].) The mathematical
premise is directionless, but the explanatory force runs in a preferred direction. And finally: 
Reversed Pendulum: Why isn't Patty's pendulum a double pendulum? Because 
Patty's pendulum doesn't have at least four equilibrium configurations (EP) and any 
double pendulum's configuration space is a torus with at least four stationary points 
(MP).
But surely Patty's engineering explains the kind of pendulum she has or does not have better 
than does fact that the pendulum has more or fewer than four equilibrium points (again, 
outside intentional contexts).
Each of Lange's examples can be used to generate a putative distinctively 
mathematical explanation, with the same mathematical premise and the same form, that few 
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scientists would accept as a genuine explanation.   Given that Lange is not aiming to revise 
radically our scientific common-sense ideas about the nature of scientific explanation, it 
would appear that Lange's model of distinctively mathematical explanation is inadequate.
To amplify this point, note that each example of reversal seems to confuse 
justification and explanation (see Hempel's [1965] distinction between reason-seeking and 
explanation-seeking why-questions). An argument justifies believing thesis P (at least 
partially) when it provides evidence that P. The pristine form of the covering-law model, i.e., 
one conjoined to the strongest form of the explanation-prediction symmetry thesis, can be 
seen as attempting to erase this boundary. The goal was to cast explanation as fundamentally 
an epistemic achievement: explanation is reduced to rational expectation. The problem, of 
course, is that one can have reason to believe P without explaining P. An Archaeopteryx fossil
gives one reason to believe that Archaeopteryx once existed, but it does not explain 
Archaeopteryx's existence. The same point has been made time and again: with barometers 
and storms, spots and measles, yellow fingers and lung cancer, and roosters and sunrises. 
Indicators are not always explainers. It was in recognition of this problem that defenders of 
the covering-law model quickly backed away from strong forms of the explanation-
prediction symmetry thesis and sought other means to account for the directionality of 
scientific explanations. It was in the face of these challenges that Salmon raised his flag in 
favor of the ontic conception.
Yet precisely the same problem appears to arise for Lange's examples: We learn 
something about Terry's knot when we learn he's untied it; we learn something about 
Königsberg from Marta's stroll; we learn something about our chopsticks when we observe 
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their contra-normal behavior; we learn something about the structure of honeycombs from 
the amount of wax used; we learn something about the life-cycles of cicadas when we 
observe predation patterns; and we learn something about a pendulum from how many 
equilibrium configurations it has. But learning something about the system is not in all cases 
tantamount to explaining that feature of the system.11
11 We leave aside whether our critique also applies to Lange's (2013a) account of 'really 
statistical explanation,' though we note that similar 'reversals' seem possible. Consider two
of Lange's examples of 'really statistical explanation': regression toward the mean and 
Rutherford and Geiger's explanation of certain behavior of alpha particles. 
Regression: Why do students with the lowest scores on the first exam tend not to be 
the students with the lowest scores on the second exam? Because there is a statistical 
relation rather than a perfect correlation between the outcomes of two tests (i.e., 
insofar as one student scored lower than another on the first test, the former student 
likely – but not certainly – scored lower on the second test) (EP) and when there is a 
statistical relation rather than a perfect correlation between two variables, extreme 
scores in one variable tend to be associated with less extreme scores in the other 
variable (i.e., “regression toward the mean” from the extremes) (MP) (170).
Alpha Particles: Why is the average number of alpha particles emitted from a steady 
source nearly constant when a large number is counted, but subject to wide 
fluctuations at shorter intervals? Because particles are emitted at random (EP) and 
“the laws of probability” (MP) (174).
Now 'reversed':
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Lange argues that the order of explanatory priority in his examples follows the degree
of modal necessity, with more necessary things explaining less necessary things. Yet this 
restriction on distinctively mathematical explanations cannot block the above examples. 
After all, the same mathematical laws are involved in the forward and reversed cases. We 
simply have changed the empirical facts. The problem appears to be that the mathematics in 
these examples is sufficiently flexible about what goes on the right and left hand side of an 
equation that it doesn't seem to have the resources internal to it to account for the 
directionality enforced in scientific common-sense. Some extra ingredient is required to sort 
genuine mathematical explanations from pretenders and, specifically, to sort explanation 
from justification. In other words, these putative cases of distinctively modal, mathematical 
Reversed Regression: Why isn't there is a statistical relation rather than a perfect 
correlation between the outcomes of the two tests? Because the students with the 
lowest scores on the first exam tend to be the students with the lowest scores on the 
second exam (EP) and when there is a statistical relation rather than a perfect 
correlation between two variables, extreme scores in one variable tend to be 
associated with less extreme scores in the other variable (MP).
Reversed Alpha Particles: Why aren't alpha particles emitted from a steady source at
random? Because it is not the case that the average number of particles emitted from a
steady source is nearly constant when a large number is counted, but subject to wide 
fluctuations at shorter intervals (EP) and “the laws of probability” (MP).
Like Reversed Chopsticks, these ’reversals’ are statistical in flavor and similarly seem to 
conflate evidence and explanation.
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explanations of natural phenomena appear to retain an ineliminable ontic component, perhaps
working implicitly in the background, but required to account for the preferred direction to 
the explanation. Mary's pile explains the kids' allotment, and not vice versa, because the 
allotment is produced from pile. The trefoil knot explains the failure to untie it, and not vice 
versa, perhaps because structures constrain functions and not vice versa. Similarly, the 
structure of Königsberg explains which walks are possible around town, but the walks do not 
explain the structure of the town. Perhaps the movement of the sticks does not explain the 
forces acting on the sticks because the pattern in the sticks is not causally relevant to the 
forces acting upon them. Perhaps life-cycle periods explain predation patterns, and not vice 
versa, because the length of a life-cycle period is causally relevant to the amount of 
predation. Perhaps the structure of honeycombs explains the amount of wax used, but not 
vice versa, because the structure of a honeycomb determines the amount of wax needed to 
build it. And perhaps the shape of Patty's pendulum is explained by her desires in choosing it 
and not by the fact that it does or does not have four stable equilibrium points precisely 
because Patty's desires are causally relevant and (in most non-intentional contexts) the four 
equilibrium points are not. In other words, in each case, it would appear that various ontic 
assumptions about what can explain what are called upon to sort out the appropriate direction
of the explanation and to weed out inappropriate applications of the same argumentative 
forms appealing to the same mathematical laws.12
12  Aggregative explanations apply to constitutive relations but exhibit a preferred direction. 
The mass of the pile of sand is explained by summing the masses of the individual grains. 
But one can infer the mass of an individual grain from the mass of the whole and the mass
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The dialectical situation might be put expressed as a tension between three 
propositions: first, that there are distinctively mathematical explanations of natural 
phenomena; second; that mathematical explanations are directionless; and third, that 
explanations of natural phenomena are not directionless.
To resolve this tension, one might deny the first of these propositions, holding that all 
distinctively mathematical explanations of natural phenomena have at least implicit within 
them a set of ontic commitments that account for the directionality of the explanations and so
for the norms that sort good from bad mathematical explanations. Perhaps once the 
explanandum has been narrowed to the point that it is susceptible of a distinctively 
mathematical explanation, the explanandum has been transformed into a mathematical rather 
than a natural fact. Our above discussion is consistent with this view but in no way forces it 
upon us. One might also deny that mathematics is directionless. Perhaps some areas of 
mathematics enforce a direction that corresponds to the explanatory norms in a given 
domain. This appears not to be the case in Lange's examples, but it does not follow that there 
are no such cases. Perhaps, that is, there are distinctively mathematical explanations of 
natural phenomena that do not face a directionality problem (Philippe Huneman, personal 
communication). 
Finally, one might reject the third proposition and allow that explanations of natural 
of the other grains. This aggregative explanation appears to have the same simple 
mathematical structure as Strawberries. In this case, it is a constitutive (not causal) 
relation that apparently accounts for the preferred direction. Perhaps parts explain wholes 
and not vice versa: an ontic commitment.  
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phenomena are directionless. This is the extreme caricature of the covering-law model we 
mentioned above, one that holds to the strong form of the prediction-explanation symmetry 
thesis. This option involves biting the bullet and accepting that shadows explain flagpoles, 
that spots explain measles, and that yellow fingers explain lung cancer. (Railton [1981], for 
example, includes such things in his 'ideal explanatory text'.)
Even if one is tempted to give up on the first proposition and to deny that there truly 
are distinctively mathematical explanations of natural phenomena, Lange's discussion 
highlights an important feature of causal and mechanistic explanation that has thus far 
received very little attention: namely, that all mechanisms are constrained to work within the 
space of logical and mathematical possibility. If how something works is explained by 
revealing constraints on its operation (as Craver and Darden [2013], for example, suggest), 
then one cannot neglect these modal constraints in a complete understanding of mechanistic 
explanation. In our view, that thesis is interesting enough even if there are not distinctively 
mathematical explanations of natural phenomena.
4. Presuppositions and Constitutive Contexts.
Although we have modeled our reconstructions on Lange's discussion, in which he 
explicitly states that contingent, empirical facts are part of the explanantia (506), he may 
object to the form of our examples. He considers and rejects the following pseudo-
explanation: 
Elliptical Orbits: Why are all planetary orbits elliptical (approximately)? Because 
each planetary orbit is (approximately) the locus of points for which the sum of the 
distances from two fixed points is a constant [EP], and that locus is (as a matter of 
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mathematical fact) an ellipse [MP]. (508)
Like the previous examples, this one has an empirical premise and a mathematical premise. 
This is not a distinctively mathematical explanation, according to Lange, because “the first 
fact to which it appeals [i.e., EP] is neither modally more necessary than ordinary causal laws
nor understood in the why question's context to be constitutive of being a planetary orbit (the 
physical arrangement in question)” (508). However, if we presuppose that the planetary 
orbits in question are just those that are loci of points for which the sum of the distances from
two fixed points is a constant, then that fact is understood in the why question's context to be 
constitutive of being a planetary orbit. The why-question then becomes: Why are all 
planetary orbits that are loci of points for which the sum of the distances from two fixed 
points is a constant, elliptical? It is constitutive of the planetary orbits in question that they 
are loci of points for which the sum of the distances from two fixed points is a constant. The 
distinctively mathematical explanation is that those loci are necessarily ellipses. Should 
Lange object to our “reversed” examples on similar grounds, their empirical premises can 
also be presupposed and shifted into their associated why-questions. For example, in 
Reversed Trefoil Knot, instead of asking, “Why doesn't Terry have a trefoil knot in his 
shoelace?” and stating as an empirical premise that Terry untied the knot, we could instead 
ask, “Why doesn't Terry have a trefoil knot in the shoelace he untied?” Now the former 
empirical premise is part of the constitutive context of the why-question. We presuppose that 
Terry untied his shoelace, rather than stating it as an empirical premise. This seems to fit 
Lange's criteria for distinctively mathematical explanation.
Lange could respond to this move by distinguishing between what is understood to be
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constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue and what is actually constitutive of 
the physical task or arrangement at issue.13 Lange could then argue that, for example, in 
Trefoil Knot it is actually constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue that Terry's
shoelace is a trefoil knot. However, Lange could continue, in the version of Reversed Trefoil 
Knot where we presuppose that Terry untied his shoelace, that fact is not actually constitutive
of the physical task or arrangement at issue. This seems to be the kind of move Lange has in 
mind when he distinguishes between what is and isn’t constitutive of the arrangement or 
physical task at issue in a given why-question’s context (2017, 43). We are unsure how this 
distinction between what is “understood” to be and “actually” constitutive could be drawn. 
Granted, in Trefoil Knot there is a single structure (i.e., the knot) the constitutive properties 
of which are determined by context (i.e., that it is trefoil) and there is not a similar single 
structure in Reversed Trefoil Knot (the same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to Königsberg).
We do not see how this is a relevant difference though. When we request an explanation for 
the fact that Terry failed to untie his shoelace, we grant that context determines that it is 
actually (and not merely understood to be) constitutive of that fact that his shoelace is a 
trefoil knot. However, when we request an explanation for the fact that Terry doesn't have a 
trefoil knot in the shoelace he untied, it seems to us constitutive of that very fact that Terry 
untied his shoelace. It wouldn't be the same explanandum had Terry not untied his shoelace. 
We do not see how one can claim that Terry's untying the knot is merely understood to be 
13 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion and careful discussion of the points in 
this section. Note that Lange (2013b) always speaks of what is “understood” to be 
constitutive in the context of the why-question (e.g., 491, 497, 506, 507, 508).
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constitutive of this explanandum, while claiming that the shoelace's being a trefoil knot is 
actually constitutive of the former explanandum.
We don't think there's anything objectionable about so restricting the range of our 
explananda/why-question (e.g., to just those planetary orbits that are loci of points for which 
the sum of the distances from two fixed points is a constant). Notice that such a restriction is 
required of Lange's examples as well. For example, it is not constitutive of all shoelaces that 
they contain trefoil knots; it is constitutive only of the shoelace under consideration, which 
actually contains a trefoil knot. Nor is it constitutive of all pendula that they are double 
pendula; nor of all arrangements of strawberries and children that there are 23 of the former 
and 3 of the latter; nor of all bridges that they have a non-Eulerian structure. This response to 
our challenge, in other words, requires an account of how context determines what is 
constitutive of the physical task or arrangement in question14, especially if it relies on a 
distinction between what is actually and merely understood to be constitutive in a given 
context.
5. Conclusion: Modal and Ontic Aspects of Mechanistic Explanations.
Return again to the flagpole and the shadow. As discussed above, Bromberger and 
Salmon used this example to demonstrate the directionality of scientific explanations. They 
enlist this point to argue for an ineliminable causal (or more broadly, ontic) component in our
normative analysis of scientific explanation. We have used the same strategy to argue for an 
ineliminable ontic component in Lange's examples of distinctively mathematical explanation.
14 This worry is raised by Pincock (2015: 875). We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
bringing this to our attention.
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But the example can be yoked for another duty.
One might, in fact, describe the flagpole example as a distinctively mathematical (or 
at least trigonometric) explanation of a natural phenomenon, one that calls out for a 
distinctively modal interpretation. Presupposing that the angle of elevation of the sun is θ and
that the height of the flagpole is h (and the flagpole and ground are straight and form a right 
angle, and that the system is Euclidean, etc.; EP), why is the length of the flagpole's shadow 
l? Once the contingent causal facts are presupposed in our empirical premise, the only 
relevant fact left to do the explaining seems to be the trigonometric fact that tan θ = h/l (MP).
Moreover, once these natural facts are presupposed, the length of the flagpole's shadow 
seems to follow by trigonometric necessity. So if we package all the natural facts into an 
empirical premise and highlight the relation tan θ = h/l, which is crucial for the argument to 
work, then we might see this as a case in which the bulk of the explanatory force is carried by
a trigonometric function. The example thus seems to provide a recipe for turning at least 
some mechanistic explanations into distinctively mathematical explanations: simply package 
all of the empirical conditions, such as the rectilinear propagation of light, or the Euclidean 
nature of spacetime, into the empirical premise or the context of the request for explanation, 
and leave a mathematical remainder or a tautology to serve as the premise with stronger-
than-natural necessity.15 
15 This could presumably be done with any kind of necessity. For example, take an 
explanation one of whose premises is a conceptual necessity. Fix or presuppose all the 
premises other than the conceptual necessity. You then have a distinctively conceptual 
explanation. Lange appears to recognize this possibility (504).  
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The importance of geometry to mechanistic explanation is readily apparent in 
artifacts, such as the coupling between an engine and the drive crank shaft of a car. 
Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) describe the organization of such mechanisms as 
geometrico-mechanical in nature. Vertical motion produced by explosions in the piston 
chambers drive the pistons out. The center of each piston is connected via a rod to the 
crankshaft at some distance (r) from the center of the crankshaft so that when the piston is 
driven out, the crankshaft is rotated in a circle. This mechanism very efficiently transfers the 
vertical force of the pistons into a circular motion that drives the car forward. These engine 
parts are organized geometrically in circles and triangles. The angle of the connecting rod, 
for example, determines the position of the piston, though the explanation would appear to 
work the other way around. Yet these mathematical facts surely are relevant to why the car 
accelerates as it does and not faster or slower.16
16 Baron, Colyvan, and Ripley (forthcoming; see also Chirimuuta forthcoming and 
Reutlinger 2016) propose assimilating this mathematical dependence to a 
“counterfactualist” account of explanation (i.e., an account according to which 
explanatory power consists in the ability to answer what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions or w-questions) and they show how to assess the relevant counterpossible 
counterfactuals within a structural equation modeling framework. We find this 
assimilation plausible but as yet inadequate, because Baron et al. (and Chirimuuta and 
Reutlinger) do not address the question of which true counterfactuals are explanatorily 
relevant and which are not. For example, there are contexts in which it is true that had the 
flagpole's shadow been length l then the flagpole's height would have been h. There are 
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But as Lange's examples aptly illustrate, mathematics appears to play an essential role
in mechanistic explanations in at least many areas of science. After all, the space of possible 
mechanisms is constrained by the space of mathematical (and logical) possibility. If one 
considers the mechanisms of sound transduction in the inner ear, one finds an arrangement 
most similar to the engine and the crankshaft, except in this case the mechanism converts 
also contexts in which it is true that had Mary divided her strawberries evenly among her 
children, then 23 would have been divisible by 3. Thus there is a similar problem of 
directionality with respect to counterfactuals: in one direction, a counterfactual can seem 
explanatory; in the other direction, it does not seem explanatory. We think that the 
distinction between explanatorily relevant and irrelevant counterfactuals must be made by 
appeal to ontic considerations (Salmon 1984; Povich forthcoming). 
Note that if the counterfactualists are right, this will go some way to dissolving the 
distinction between ontic and modal conceptions of explanation. According to 
counterfactualists, causal, mechanistic, distinctively mathematical, and all other kinds of 
explanation derive their explanatory power from their ability to answer w-questions about 
their explananda. No one, as far as we know, takes the distinction between causal and 
mechanistic explanation to be significant enough to warrant relegating each to a different 
conception of explanation. The distinction between them is real and there is disagreement 
about how to make it, but, even noting the real differences between causal and constitutive
relevance, no one takes the distinction to mark two wholly different conceptions of what it
means to explain. If the counterfactualists are right, the distinction between distinctively 
mathematical explanations and causal/mechanistic explanations seems as insignificant for 
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vibrations in the air into vibrations in fluid. Still, parts are arranged geometrically. Likewise, 
when we look into the intricate mechanisms gating ion channels, we seem to find structures 
that are understood geometrically, in terms of sheets and helices, which structures allow or 
prohibit certain activities (Kandel et al. 2013). Structural information has been essential to 
understanding the mechanisms of protein synthesis and inheritance and to understanding 
features of macro evolution (Craver and Darden 2013). Perhaps not all of these explanations 
are distinctively mathematical, but the mathematics does ineliminable work in revealing how 
the mechanism operates, how it can operate, and how it cannot. 
This blend of the mathematical and the mechanical (or more broadly, the ontic) is, in 
fact, precisely what one would expect based on the history of the mechanical philosophy. 
Aristotle's (or pseudo-Aristotle's) mechanics works fundamentally by reducing practical 
problems to facts about circles (1936). Hero of Alexandria and Archimedes, though 
celebrated for the practical utility of their simple machines, viewed those machines equally as
geometrical puzzles to be solved. Descartes' conception of the mechanistic structure of the 
world was directly connected with his planar representation of geometrical space, in which 
extended things interact through contact. Galileo demonstrated his results with thought 
the theory of explanation as the distinction between causal and mechanistic explanation. 
There is no philosophically significant reason to lump a few kinds of explanation together 
and say that they explain in accordance with an “ontic conception” and the others in 
accordance with a “modal conception”. For the counterfactualist, all are simply species of 
a genus, and all explain by providing answers to w-questions.
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experiments, such as the Tower of Pisa, that rely on basic mathematical truths (i.e., an object 
cannot both accelerate and decelerate at the same time). Newton wrote the Principia, like the 
great physicists before him, in the language of geometry. Dijksterhuis (1986) closes his 
masterly Mechanization of the Scientific World Picture with the cautionary note that, “serious
misconceptions would be created if mechanization and mathematization were presented as 
antitheses” (500). It is a misconception because the mathematization of nature and the search 
for basic mechanistic explanatory principles have been treated historically as distinct aspects 
of the same explanatory enterprise. The very idea of mechanism, and the idea of the world as 
a causal nexus, has always been expressed in tandem, rather than in opposition, to the idea 
that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics and the belief that a primary
aim of science is to leave nothing in words. 
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